Class Responses and Instructor Comments

 

>From Mildred Ferentino:

Because it can never imply a contradiction and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinction, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation that it will rise.

>rm says: This is Hume's example. But this really begs an explanation.

>From eddie:

He supports this claim by using the example of the sun not rising the next day. What proof do we have that tells us that the sun will rise. There's nothing very concrete that tell us it will and won't rise.

 

>rm says: This is part of it. Also, he talks about not finding the effect in the cause, which is relevant. Most importantly, he refers to the Principle of Contradiction, here.

>From Avrohom Markovits:

every matter of fact is not certain, therfore the opposite of something not certain can be equally true or false. as opposed to the relation of ideas, which are certain concepts, which can either be true or false, real or fake.

 

>rm says: This is a nice way to put part of the answer.

>From Avrohom:

part b: ?? what support does this claim need? its logical!

>rm says: I mean, how does Hume support his claim that the contraries of matters of fact are also possible? It has to do with his discussion of how we learn about effects.

 

>From eddie:

Could the answer to this question be correct if I combine my answer with Avrohom?

>rm says: I was just thinking that both of you neglect to mention his discussion of our being unable to derive an effect from mere examination of the preceding cause. So, when he refers to a man placed on Earth with no experience but with ability to reason, and Hume clams that such a person would be unable to predict effects, he is providing a good portion of the argument that whatever happens might happen differently. (One could write a book in response to this question, of course.)