As always, the following guidelines for submissions should be followed:

All papers should be sent to the editors electronically. The author's name, the title of the paper and full mailing address should appear on a separate page. *Nothing that identifies the author or his or her institution should appear within the body or within the footnotes/endnotes of the paper.* The title of the paper should appear on the top of the paper itself.

Authors should adhere to the production guidelines that are available from the APA. For example, in writing your paper to disk, *please do not use your word processor's footnote or endnote function; all notes must be added manually at the end of the paper.* This rule is extremely important, for it makes formatting the papers for publication much easier.

All articles submitted to the *Studies in Teaching* undergo anonymous review by the editorial committee:

Tziporah Kasachkoff, The Graduate Center, CUNY (tkasachkoff@yahoo.com), co-editor

Eugene Kelly, New York Institute of Technology (ekelly@nyit.edu), co-editor

Robert Talisse, Vanderbilt University (robert.talisse@vanderbilt.edu)

Andrew Wengraf (andrew@welch-wengraf.fsnet.uk)

Contributions should be sent to the editors:

Tziporah Kasachkoff
Philosophy Department, CUNY Graduate Center
365 Fifth Avenue, New York City, NY 10016
tkasachkoff@yahoo.com

and/or

Eugene Kelly, at ekelly@nyit.edu

POEM

The Philosophical Circus

John DeCarlo
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY

Come One, Come All!

Amid echoes of ancient ontological currents
And the sweetness of Spring's butterfly grass
Welcome to the Long Island Philosophical Society!

Here, and only here, will you
Witness the gravitas of the strongman
Easily dead-lifting multiple metaphysical dimensions

The daring agility and logical certainty of trapeze artists
Oscillating to and fro with gestures of grace and elegance

A mime, with tender cheek, rosey nose and unspoken glance,
Intimating primordial dances of the sacred and profane

Lions and Tigers leaping through fierce flames of ethical tensions

Jugglers, right and left, alternating the flow of dialectics
With the fluidity of reversals and inversions

The balance and finesse of acrobats
Adroitly flipping with keen analysis &
Tumbling with elongated synthesis

And all the while, admire the knife thrower and his daggers
Hitting the marks of truth, beauty and goodness –
Never slighting the flesh of humanity &

Don't overlook the epistemological midget
Quietly slipping into the thinnest phases of the sublime &

The magician, amid raspberry blooms and silky silhouettes,
Conjuring up energetic particles from the purity of merriment

Yea, Come One, Come All!
And savor joyful melody's deepest refrain
In sweet harmony with our Philosophical Reign!!

ARTICLES

Summer Experiments in Pedagogical Innovation

Russell Marcus and Catherine Schmitt
HAMILTON COLLEGE

In summer 2022 we directed (Russell) and attended (Catherine) the Hamilton College Summer Program in Philosophy (HCSPiP), which offered three unique courses designed to push the limits of students' imaginations through innovative philosophical pedagogy. Professors Anthony Weston (emeritus, Elon University) taught "Philosophers Reimagine the World: A Conceptual Toolbox for 21st Century Possibilists"; Mike Barnes (Australian National University) taught "Disagreement in the Digital Age: Philosophical Reflection About/With New Technology"; and Ashley Pryor (University of Toledo) taught "Philosophy and Comedy." Each course ran for ten ninety-minute sessions over two weeks. The program culminated in a live-streamed conference in which instructors reported on their work. This essay is a report on the classes, written in the hopes of disseminating some of the innovations.

Unlike other summer philosophy programs, the focus of the HCSPiP is not primarily to prepare students for further

studies in philosophy, but to encourage and disseminate pedagogical innovation for undergraduates. Each year, we solicit applications from faculty for creative proposals for new ways to teach. We provide twenty eager undergraduate students, three graduate student tutors, no content requirements, no prescribed classroom structure, and no grades. Students are compensated for their time with stipends and the opportunity to learn in an environment that is free of the constraints and pressures of their typical educational institutions: learning philosophy for the sake of learning. Students and faculty can broaden their ideas of how philosophy may be edifying and fun. We measure the success of our courses mainly with post-program feedback, in the forms of surveys for students and instructors. We also encourage instructors to disseminate the results of their experiments in presentations and journal articles, with the hope that they will find homes in philosophy classrooms.

Anthony Weston, using pedagogy as conceived in his book, *Teaching as the Art of Staging*, taught a course meant to broaden students' views of how philosophy could be applied outside the classroom. On the first day of class he presented each table of students with a plastic cup of water and posed the question, "How many ways can you empty the water without moving the cup?"

We quickly went to work brainstorming: "You could soak it up with a sock!"

"I could drink it with a straw."

"We could tip the table—but would that count as moving the cup?"

"We could wait for it to evaporate!"

When the class came back, exhausted of ideas, together we had come up with thirty-six different methods of removing water from our cups.

Then Weston announced, "Now empty the cup using a method that we haven't come up with yet."

At first shocked, because we thought we had discussed every strategy possible, the class quickly began to search for new solutions. My table used a disemboweled pen as a vacuum, covering one end of the barrel with a finger to pull water out of the cup; soon every table in the room was soaked by quick thinking and new ideas. Even when we thought we had found every solution, there were still more discoveries to be made. Weston was teaching us to trust ourselves to persist past what can seem like the end of our work, to remember that further progress is possible even when we think we have exhausted all solutions.

Over the next two weeks Weston asked us to think in new ways and stretch ourselves to find diverse solutions to problems. One day we worked in teams to invent ways to show how large-scale time might be alternatively conceived; we recalibrated our minds to view the present as a period of ten thousand years as suggested by Stewart Brand and then invented and drew plans for constructing something that reflected large-scale time—elaborate rituals for celebrating centuries and millennia, giant sun-powered clocks, and time-keeping circuses. No ideas were disregarded. Weston challenged us to think bigger, making the looming problems of the present such as climate change and women's rights and poverty seem like tiny blips in the course of time rather than the gutting catastrophes we often felt them as.

Any ideas worth thinking were worth thinking *more*. We read portions of Weston's book, *Creativity for Critical Thinkers*. There, he described different strategies for creativity, including the exotic association method and the tool of exaggeration. For exotic associations, we opened books to random pages, closed our eyes, and put a finger down on the page; whichever word it pointed to would be used as a catalyst for new ideas. Weston promoted using the tool of exaggeration to "take some feature of the problem and push it as far as it can go," as we did in the water experiment. Imagine perfect solutions first, and then backtrack to find plausible compromises. Such creative activities may seem a little silly, but that's the point. "A little silliness may be just what we need. Randomness—generating possible prompts without filters—is exactly what it may take to break out of the rut that we happen to be in (but can't quite see)."[1]

One day, we used the Drake equation, which is commonly used to estimate the number of extraterrestrial civilizations in the Milky Way, to form our own conclusions about the probability of alien life existing in the universe; we came up with numbers ranging from three planets containing alien life to hundreds of thousands. Then, we were asked to invent our own creative form of alien life. We invented tiny bacteria-like aliens that communicated through pheromone release, aliens that existed as the spots in your vision when you stood up too fast, and giant sea monster-like creatures that lived on Jupiter. As the class came back to present their new alien concepts, Weston asked, "Would we, as humans, be able to communicate with your invented alien?"

"Probably not."

"Even if we could make contact, I don't think it would be a good idea. . ."

"Our aliens wouldn't be able to communicate like humans do."

Many scientists have made calculations using the Drake equation and many attempts to contact aliens, for example by the SETI Institute, have been made to no avail. Yet, we all devised aliens that couldn't be contacted through radio wave projections into the universe. Other life forms might exist in totally different ways from ourselves; failure to make contact with aliens meant nothing about their existence. Some philosophical questions require us to understand humans and our social and political relationships better, like how to improve the justness of our political arrangements. Others, like the nature of personhood or value, might require thinking beyond human-centric perspectives to develop non-chauvinistic characterizations of those concepts.

In the second week, our class took a field trip to Common Place Land Cooperative, an intentional community in Truxton, NY. Intentional communities are voluntary residential organizations designed for social cohesion and interdependence. Common Place operates on principles of environmental stewardship, using consensus to make collective decisions. In preparation, we had explored records from previous alternative living communities in the US in the Hamilton College library archives. We approached the field trip with lots of questions: Is it possible for "Ecovillages" to operate on a large scale? Is seclusion necessary for an alternative living community—is seclusion a good thing? Are alternative communities the best way to challenge social norms? We spent the trip hauling wood, making salad, caging peach trees, moving gravel, and using compostable toilets, engaging the community throughout. While we came to the experience with ideas of living sustainably by driving electric cars and using paper straws, the off-grid, agricultural eco community presented a wildly different way of reimagining sustainability.

Weston urged students to step back to reform their ideas about modern problems. Innovative philosophical thinking is a gateway into viewing modern solutions as springboards into worlds of new ideas. In classrooms, encouraging students to evaluate what they take for granted about the world around them can lead to critical thinking about how to better fix problems. Activities similar to the water cup, alien, or time-drawing projects require students to stretch their minds and think creatively beyond what we imagine our limits to be, while working and communicating collaboratively.

By the end of Weston's course, some students were enthralled by the prospect of living in an ecovillage and others were fascinated by the probabilities of extraterrestrial life. Teaching creativity and how to reimagine different aspects of the world leads to more mindful philosophy students who are prepared to challenge social constructs and norms.

Mike Barnes dived into the implications of the quickly growing internet in his course. We had prepared by reading John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* and Sarah Jeong's *The Internet of Garbage* before the program began. We started the course framed by both the idealism of free speech and the shocking realities of how harmful what is published on the internet can be to people's psyches and safety.

Throughout the course, Barnes asked us to communicate in various ways. It became quickly apparent that the medium through which discussions occurred changed conversational dynamics, sometimes radically. In one class, we placed sticky notes on the classroom board with our opinions, anonymously, to indicate the media platform we used most, allowing us freely to represent what each of us liked about a diverse range of platforms. Another day, we wrote down our thoughts on Mill's harm principle and read them aloud. Writing down answers made it harder to hide or adjust our opinions. Since we couldn't change our answers the conversation never evolved beyond initial reactions.

Towards the end of the course, we all joined an online anonymous group chat to answer some class discussion questions. We typed and sent messages incognito. Despite our being otherwise thoughtful, the anonymous conversation quickly devolved into streams of lewd comments, shaming, and spam. Philosophical discussion was nearly impossible over such a platform. Taking a step back to discuss online anonymity in conjunction with Jeong's claim that online discourse has enabled catastrophes, students learned that anonymity combined with the minimal time required to put ideas online drastically changes what people are willing to say and do.

It quickly became apparent that Mill's ideals of freedom of speech and minimal governmental control are obsolete in a world where global communication allows for widespread hate speech and subliminal messaging. We grappled with the concept that people naturally surround themselves with media that agrees with them, creating echo chambers of specific political or scientific ideas that reject all outside opinions and even facts. We questioned our own self-determination. Are we in control of our own beliefs and actions if, as Joeng described, Facebook can make more of us vote and Google can tailor search results to our past patterns? Many current media platforms employ fact-checking, but we discussed the difficulties of effective curation and how unbiased fact-checking is impossible since every curator has personal opinions. The best escape seemed to be an off-grid Ecovillage!

Teaching students how their media of communication change what they say and think is valuable in helping young philosophers understand the opinions and ideas they and others present. An exploration of various ways to discuss, communicate, and collect information can teach students their own subconscious biases and how their worlds can be changed by the online platforms they use. Through experimenting with anonymity and identification in writing, typing, reading, and voting exercises, Barnes demonstrated how the media with which we engage can drastically alter our thoughts. We walked away fascinated by how the social media platforms we use impact our interactions with friends and strangers, as well as the beliefs we hold.

Professor Ashley Pryor began her course with icebreakers in the form of improvisation games. Most of us had never done improv or acting before and the games set the stage for a classroom of quick thinking and lightheartedness, which contrasted with the labored contemplation—and its often concomitant hesitancy—commonly found in a traditional classroom. We spent the first two days learning philosophical theories of comedy, interspersing improv activities with small-group work. We built conceptual foundations by exploring different theories of comedy. We looked at superiority theory, a view adopted by Aristotle and the Stoics, which postulated that comedy arises from ridiculing others to make ourselves feel superior, as well as incongruity theory, a view held by Kant and Kierkegaard, which held that discrepancy between reality and our expectations was the primary cause of laughter. For students, these discussions raised the question of whether laughter was ethical. Realizing the discomfort among students with some contemporary comedians,

Pryor paused the abstract theoretic work to encourage us to choose three controversial current comedians for a cancellation trial: Each student came into class on Thursday as either a prosecutor, a defendant, or a jury member, ready to apply theories of comedy, ethics, and politics in order to decide whether Dave Chapelle, Louis C.K., and Bill Burr should be allowed comedic platforms.

"Chapelle makes people laugh using superiority-theory-type comedy and thus is alienating already marginalized groups!"

"But John Stuart Mill would say that he should be allowed freedom of speech!"

"Wait but is public alienation of marginalized groups directly encouraging physical harm? I think Mill would say that the harm principle applies here!"

"Then should we cancel him completely or just regulate his material? How do we draw solid lines between what's okay to joke about and what's problematic?"

The exercise merged the worlds of philosophy, comedy, and policy, raising questions of the harm that comedy can do, and exploring possibilities, both prudential and ethical, for regulating sexist, transphobic, and racist messaging.

Other highlights of the course included a workshop with an improv troupe from Second City Chicago, and a class on satire writing, led by the course tutor, Chris Bousquet (Syracuse University). Bousquet and Pryor encouraged students to create their own satire based on news stories they found appalling, using tools such as exaggeration and repetition of increasingly outrageous ideas, both of which connected to work we did with Weston. We practiced improv games, evaluated ethical dimensions of new comedy, and workshopped writing pieces which satirized Fourth of July celebrations, new abortion laws, the banning of juuls, and more. In one popular improv game, Pryor asked students to act as different characters while a party host tried to guess their roles: conservative grandpa, person with smelly feet, giraffe, garden gnome.

Working with improv helped us to train ourselves to listen carefully to others, a skill essential to good philosophy and emphasized by Tina Fey. "The second rule of improvisation is not only to say yes, but YES, AND. You are supposed to agree and then add something of your own. . . . YES, AND means don't be afraid to contribute. It's your responsibility to contribute. Always make sure you're adding something to the discussion. Your initiations are worthwhile."[2] We practiced saying "YES, AND" in improv scenes, creating bigger ideas and adding more energy into dialogues. The course culminated in a performance that included both improvisational games and satire pieces.

Our regular philosophy classes have conditioned us to believe that refined and carefully contemplated thoughts are most valuable to philosophical discourse. In contrast, Pryor encouraged us to take risks, to let go of our conditioned beliefs, and find new ideas and value in spontaneous exclamations during improv. Asking students to acknowledge previous ideas and build on them by using "YES, AND" as a tool could be used to facilitate better conversations in classrooms. A comedians-on-trial activity could be directed in any class on applied ethics or political philosophy, and is an attractive way to bring philosophical theory into contact with students' extracurricular interests. Improv-like warm-up exercises could be utilized in any philosophy classroom as both ice breakers and ways to make students feel encouraged to contribute openly. There are good reasons for philosophers to think slowly at times. Pryor taught the benefits of quick thinking, particularly in classroom settings: building community, removing barriers, and finding new perspectives.

The program served as a brief collision between many different viewpoints and pedagogies. The unique ideas of each student, tutor, and professor could be expressed and discussed both inside and outside the classroom, leading students to engage with their peers in deep discussions about how they view the world and their place within it. In post-program surveys, 89 percent of students agreed or strongly agreed that their classes showed them new ways to learn and 83 percent agreed or strongly agreed that the program changed the way they think about philosophy and its role in their lives. In their anonymous feedback, we heard the following:

> I think this program and this course in particular helped me feel a lot more free and curious about how a philosophical outlook can energize any of the work I do. . . . After three years of philosophy courses, I felt that I was stuck in a certain (flawed) philosophical, analytical mode of thinking that started to become repetitive and routine. These [courses] definitely helped address that feeling. . . . The class gave me a much better awareness of when and how I was participating in discussions. . . . With philosophy readings, it's easy to figure out a central thesis, attempt to understand the piece, decide if I agree, and stop there. But there's always a baseline assumption that needs to be questioned, or a way to take the argument further in the world, and I will be looking for those pieces in future classes. . . .

Most summer philosophy programs for undergraduates focus on preparing students for graduate school, often with the laudable goal of diversifying the discipline by supporting students from identity groups underrepresented in philosophy. HCSPiP, instead, centers on student engagement, risk-taking, and finding joy in philosophy studying and teaching, providing an inclusive environment to explore together. Weston, Barnes, and Pryor employed innovative teaching strategies which changed the way students partook in classroom activities and understood the concepts they were learning. Students were left with new perspectives on how philosophy can change the world.

NOTES

1. Weston, *Teaching as the Art of Staging*, 14.
2. Fey, *Bossypants*, 137.

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Plagiarism and the Indispensability of Authorship

Isaac Nevo

BEN-GURION UNIVERSITY

As commonly understood, plagiarism is a form of theft and dishonesty which occurs when one person intentionally puts one's name to the already expressed ideas of another, and falsely claims them to be his or her own. The theft in question is of a non-tangible good—credit (academic, literary, or other)—which is due to another. The dishonesty consists in misrepresentation of original authorship to third parties, for example, university authorities, professional colleagues, the scholarly record,[1] or the public at large. Plagiarism is, thus, a two-sided offense with both direct and indirect victims, namely, those on the one hand whose credit has been robbed, and those on the other who suffer the damages of degraded practices. In this paper I shall defend a normative conception of plagiarism, involving theft of credit and dishonest misrepresentation as basic ingredients, against various attempts to take the sting out of plagiarism charges by contextualizing the notions of authorship and originality which underlie the normative force of the term. However, the normative aspect of plagiarism is not to be captured by any general definition of the term. It is, rather, a "family resemblance" concept, governed by overlapping similarities rather than conditions that are jointly necessary and sufficient. Correspondingly, there are varieties of plagiarism, involving different degrees and forms of theft or dishonesty that are exemplified in diverse cases.

Theft and dishonesty are clearly normative terms of both ethics and law, and what makes these concepts applicable to literary or scientific credit is the relative value placed, in different settings, on the twin concepts of authorship and originality, and the consequent recognition and rewards that authorship and originality merit. More specifically, the issue in plagiarism is mis-applied credit for an original contribution to some common good deemed worthy of reward rather than, as the matter is often formulated, an issue of intellectual "property" which may be legally protected in copyrights, patents, or other legal devices. Plagiarism infringes upon credit that is owed, not necessarily property that is owned. Such credit may take many forms other than financial remuneration. Indeed, the concept of plagiarism has long preceded the developments of the various copyright laws and protections. Related ethical issues concern how the common good that is jeopardized by plagiarism is to be understood, what excellences (and sacrifices) the common good requires, how contributions to it are rewarded, in what ways such rewards can be "stolen," and what damage results upon such misrepresentation.

In the academic setting the common good is understood to be the advancement and dissemination of knowledge for which the introduction of theoretical novelties generated by original theorists and scholars (or groups thereof) is held to be essential. By contrast, in the realm of literary fiction the good served may be thought of as the enrichment of culture through unique expressions of human experience. What novelty is to knowledge, uniqueness is to literary culture; and both are goods that are forms of the excellence of originality which is revealed in personal or collective accomplishments that can easily be laid claim to by pretenders. In both realms of activity original authorship is an excellence thought to be worthy of (different kinds of) social reward.

The distinction between the ethical issue of plagiarism and the legal issue of copyrights is often mistakenly conflated. Plagiarism may occur where no copyright protections are present and copyright violations need not involve plagiarism at all. One may plagiarize texts in the public domain, and one may republish, or translate, a copyright protected text (piracy) without plagiarizing it, i.e., without making any false claims of self-authorship. The understanding of a text as property distinguishable from the physical book in which the text appears—the type vs. the token—appeared in early modern times with the development of print and markets for books, and it was publishers rather than authors who first sought and received these protections.[2] Before that time there was not much to be gained by legally protecting texts as property. But the ethics of recognizing authors has a longer history, as the very term "plagiarism," coined in the first century AD by the Roman poet Marcus Valerius Martialis (Martial; c.48–104, AD), suggests. Lacking the relevant (modern) notion of texts as "owned property," Martial highlighted literary theft as a kind of symbolic kidnapping[3] in which it is not a tangible product that is stolen but what may be viewed as the creative identity of a person.[4]

In this paper, the focus will be on plagiarism as an ethical concern in the academic setting—that is, in scientific and scholarly research and in higher education and teaching. In these contexts, the common good to be served is the production and dissemination of knowledge, valued both for its own sake and for the sake of service to society. To contribute to that common good is to introduce some novelty to the body of existing knowledge or its application, such originality then being rewarded with some form of academic credit and benefit. The point of these rewards is, obviously, to enhance further knowledge by encouraging those whose capabilities have proven adequate to the task of producing it. When it comes to teaching, the originality of students is taken to consist in their independence in formulating hypotheses or reaching conclusions "in their own words," even when these "words" are not, strictly

speaking, novel contributions to human knowledge. Again, the point is to develop in students the capacities requisite for the production of knowledge or its expert application.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AUTHORSHIP AND ORIGINALITY

This common understanding of plagiarism as an ethical concern involving authorial originality has not gone unchallenged. Broadly speaking, two lines of argument have been offered against this view. As noted above, some following Foucault regard both authorship and plagiarism to be modern (and Western) constructs, born of the understanding of texts as property, which developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[5] On this line of reasoning, projecting the concepts of authorship and plagiarism upon pre-modern, or non-Western cultures (or educational systems) is ill-conceived. Others, following structuralist and post-structuralist reasoning, speak rather of the "death of the author,"[6] viewing the very idea of authorial originality as a myth.

On this account, a problem arises for any view of "plagiarism" as a normative term of criticism since, according to this view, the normative force of the charge of plagiarism is anchored upon the notions of "authorship" and "originality" and therefore depends upon the viability of these terms. If, however, authorship is a matter of convention or social construction and has no fixed or independent grounding of its own, the charge of plagiarism loses its normative force. Ron Scollon (1995), for example, has argued that "the common-sense view of texts as commercial products, and of the author as the manufacturer of those texts . . . represent the economic/ideological system which arose in Europe in the time of the enlightenment."[7] On this view, norms of authorship are not applicable to pre-modern or non-Western writing. Rather, "it is difficult if not impossible to maintain that any clear understanding is ever possible of just who might stand in the role of the private authorial self."[8] Scollon concludes that without such clarity any attribution of authorship is nothing but a "historically established system for the distribution of social power and privilege,"[9] a fact that belies universal application of anti-plagiarism norms across cultural and historical boundaries.

A similar argument regarding the impossibility of originality and authorship appears in Pennycook (1996) and Chandasoma et al. (2004). Alastair Pennycook objects to the "unilateral" deployment of the concept of plagiarism in the context of international collegiate education, particularly, as that notion is used in non-Western educational settings. "My chief interest," he says, "was to describe what has increasingly been promoted as a global academic norm and to contextualize it as a particular cultural and historical practice."[10] Pennycook's purpose is to find room for cultural differences in the understanding both of what learning is and of the role that memory and repetition (rather than originality and individuality) might have in it. Pennycook writes: "what I am trying to get at is the ways in which relationships to text, memory, and learning may differ. To deal equitably with our students, we need to appreciate such differences."[11] While preserving some room for the (normative) possibility of "transgressive" textual borrowing, Pennycook argues for greater flexibility regarding the standards by which such transgression is to be judged.

Pennycook's respect for other cultures' ways of viewing what is important in the realm of education is laudable. However, in "contextualizing" plagiarism for these good purposes, no strong argument against authorship or originality of the kind Pennycook offers is required. Plagiarism is committed only when there is an *intention* to deceive and steal credit. However, when "borrowing" is practiced by, say, Chinese students as part of the learning practices to which they are accustomed, no such intention exists and therefore no basis appears for the charge of plagiarism. Pennycook does, however, go for a much stronger argument to establish his point. In that argument he questions the concept of authorship altogether. (As it turns out, although he makes the argument about authorship, he then shies away from its conclusion, seeing it as possibly "too relativistic,"[12] and he falls back on the weaker conclusion that while "unacceptable borrowing practices" should be criticized, accusations of plagiarism in intercultural contexts ought not to be "unilateral" or culturally insensitive. The latter claim is, as I argued above, fully compatible with a normative notion of plagiarism.)

Pennycook makes the case against authorship and originality in the following terms:

> The postmodern and poststructuralist positions on language, discourse, and subjectivity . . . raise serious questions for any notion of individual creativity or authorship. If, instead of a Self or an Identity, we consider the notion of subjectivity . . . then we arrive at more or less a reversal of the speaking subject creating meaning: we are not speaking subjects but spoken subjects, we do not create language but are created by it. As I suggested earlier, the question then becomes not so much one of who authored a text but how we are authored by texts.[13]

Taking the concepts of originality and authorship to be nothing but a modernist myth, Pennycook concludes that the charge of plagiarism has nothing on which to rest other than the power of ruling academic elites. Since texts are not authorial productions but rather collections of permanently circulating signs beyond the control of any subject, no "texts" are original and no individual stands alone as originator and producer. What follows from this is that individual authors are "constructed" by texts, culturally (and collaboratively) produced, and textual borrowing is therefore not plagiarism but merely the inevitable drift of words from text to text (through which authorship is constructed). When university instructors tell students to avoid plagiarism by using only "their own words," they are setting them an impossible task since no words are ever genuinely our own. Pennycook tries to sharpen this point by quoting Barthes:

> A text is not a line of words releasing a single "theological" meaning (the "message" of the author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original,

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

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