Philosophy 203: History of Modern Western Philosophy Hamilton College
Spring 2010 Russell Marcus
Tuesdays, Thursdays: 9am - 10:15am rmarcus1@hamilton.edu

Class 14 - March 4
Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*
Book II, Chapters I-VIII (AW 322-337); Book II, Chapter XXVII (AW 367-377)

I. Appearance and Reality

Locke rejects a contentious form of the doctrine of innate ideas.
He doesn't seem to be arguing against specific arguments in Descartes, Spinoza, or Leibniz, say, but against a position which holds claims like UA.
Locke has thus been accused of attacking a straw person, rather than a serious argument.
Still, that criticism holds only against the negative arguments against abstract ideas.
Locke's positive claim, that our beliefs can be justified by appeal only to sense experience, and some basic mental capacities, is independent of his criticisms of innate ideas.
If he can show how we acquire knowledge while avoiding any appeal to innate ideas, we might prefer his empiricist account to a more tendentious rationalist system.
We might, that is, appeal to Ockhamist principles of simplicity to prefer Locke's account.
So, it will be worthwhile to return to Descartes's criticisms of sense experience.
We want to see how Locke deals with the problems that impelled Descartes to denigrate sense experience.

Aristotle had taken sensory qualities to be properties of external objects.
The redness and sweetness of an apple are real properties of the apple itself.
Our senses are attuned to the external environment.
For example, color vision occurs when a person's eyes are changed to be like the color of an external object.
I see the apple as red because my eye itself is able to change to red.
The eye's changing to match the environment is perception.
Similarly, in thinking, we are changed to match the forms of other objects in the world.

Descartes presented (at least) three considerations which weighed against the veridicality of sense experience:

1. The illusion and dream doubts;
2. The wax argument; and
3. The rejection of the Resemblance Hypothesis on the basis of the example of the sun.

The moral of the illusion argument is to take care to use one's senses in the best way possible.
It impugned sense evidence when we are in poor conditions, looking at distant or very small objects, say.
We need not dismiss all of our sense evidence on the basis of illusion, as Descartes admitted.

Descartes dismissed the dream argument, in Meditation Six, almost without argument.
There, he was relying on the goodness of God not to deceive.
If we withhold the divine guarantee, Descartes's argument is weak.
Locke's arguments against the dream doubt, though, are no stronger than Descartes's, as we have seen.
But the dream doubt is a skeptical hypothesis, difficult, perhaps impossible, to defeat.
One reasonable response to the skeptic is merely to ignore her.
In any case, Descartes's other two arguments are more serious.

The wax argument proceeded by demonstrating a single physical object with contradictory sense properties.
Just as I can not both be in my office and not in my office, or both tall and short, the wax can not be both yellow and clear, both smell of flowers and lack odor.
Descartes's conclusion was that the wax is an extended body which can take various manifestations, hot or cold, sweet or tasteless, but is identified with none of these particular sensory qualities.
That is, physical objects are essentially things which can have sensory qualities, but which need not have any particular ones.
The same object may have many different appearances.
The appearance of an object is distinct from its real qualities.
The obvious question for us metaphysicians is which qualities are real, and which are mere appearances.
The distinction between the real and merely apparent qualities of objects has come to be known as the primary/secondary distinction.
The primary qualities are the real ones, and the secondary properties are the apparent ones.

Descartes believed that the only real property of physical objects was their extension.

> The only principles which I accept, or require, in physics are those of geometry and pure mathematics; these principles explain all natural phenomena, and enable us to provide quite certain demonstrations regarding them (Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* II.64, AT VIIIA.78)

Further, mathematical claims are not derived from sense evidence, since our imagination is not capable of representing true extension.
We think of extension mathematically, using pure thought.

Descartes's view that extension is the only essential property of physical objects was not standard.
Many philosophers of the modern era believed that physical objects really had primary qualities of size, shape, mass, motion, and number.
Those philosophers, like Galileo who wrote that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics, argued for the reality of other mathematically-describable properties.
The expansion of the list of real properties from Descartes's extension to the other qualities does not indicate any difference in principle.

The primacy of mathematical properties explains Descartes's rejection of the Resemblance Hypothesis on the basis of the example of the sun.
Recall that Descartes contrasted our sense idea of the sun (as very small) with the mathematical idea of the sun (very large) and favored the latter.
Again, Descartes dismissed sense properties, taking only mathematical properties as real.
He thought of the secondary, sensory properties, as artifacts of interactions between our bodies and other bodies, and not as real properties of those external bodies.

> Most philosophers maintain that sound is nothing but a certain vibration of the air which strikes our ears. Thus, if the sense of hearing transmitted to our mind the true image of its object then, instead of making us conceive the sound, it would have to make us conceive the motion of the parts of the air which is then vibrating against our ears (Descartes, *Le Monde*, AT XI.5).

If my experience of sound really resembled the sound, then I would hear motion, not music.
Thus, Descartes is a nominalist about secondary properties.

Galileo argued for the primary/secondary distinction on analogy with a feather.

> When touched upon the soles of the feet, for example, of under the knee or armpit, it feels in addition to the common sensation of touch a sensation on which we have imposed a special name, 'tickling'. this sensation belongs to us and not to the hand. Anyone would make a serious error if he said that the hand, in addition to the properties of moving and touching, possessed another faculty of tickling, as if tickling were a phenomenon that resided in the hand that tickled (Galileo, *The Assayer*, 275).

No one thinks that the tickle is in the feather.
Similarly, we should not think that the color, or odor, or taste, or heat, is in the object which we perceive as colored, odored, tasty, or hot.
All of these properties are just the result of contact between our sense apparatus and a real object with primary qualities.
They are not, as Aristotle would have, the result of our senses being changed to match the object.
Physical objects are just particles in motion, and they communicate this motion to us.
Just as we don't think that the pain or tickle is in the knife or feather, we should not think that redness or sweetness is in the apple.

Arguments from analogy, like Galileo's, are weak, since everything is like everything else in some way.
We need to know if the analogy holds in a particular, relevant way.

II. Locke's Arguments for the Primary/Secondary Distinction

While the primary/secondary distinction pre-dates Locke by at least a century, and we saw it in our discussion of Hobbes's work, Locke provides a comprehensive argument for the distinction.
Locke agrees with Descartes and other earlier philosophers that at least some sense qualities are not veridical.
The debate between Locke and Descartes concerns whether no sense experience is veridical.
We will look first at Locke's arguments for the primary/secondary distinction, and then turn to his use of that distinction in the service of his empiricism.

Locke's water experiment (II.VIII.21) plays a role in his epistemology similar to the wax example for Descartes.
Consider three buckets, each containing water of a different temperature: hot, lukewarm, and cold.
Put one hand into the hot water and one into the cold water, and let them sit for a short while.
Then, take them out, and put both hands into the lukewarm water.
The lukewarm water will feel hot to one hand, and cold to the other.
The water, like the wax, displays incompatible sense properties.

Note that Locke's example is even more compelling than Descartes's.
In the water experiment, the same object displays incompatible properties at the same time.
I mentioned that one possible response to the wax argument was Heraclitean.
The Heraclitean argues that any change in the properties of an object entails a change in the object itself.
Or, for two objects to be the same object, they must share all properties.
The Heraclitean claims that the wax before melting and after melting are different objects, and so no contradiction arises among the sensory properties.
There are just two different objects, loosely tied together merely by a name, 'wax'.

Locke's solution to Descartes's problem is Heraclitean.

> No one subject can have two smells or two colors at the same time. To this perhaps will be said, has not an opal, or the infusion of *lignum nephriticum*, two colors at the same time? To which I answer that these bodies, to eyes differently placed, it is different parts of the object that reflect the particles of light. And therefore it is not the same part of the object, and so not the very same subject, which at the same time appears both yellow and azure. For it is as impossible that the very same particle of any body should at the same time differently modify or reflect the rays of light, as that it should have two different figures and textures at the same time (IV.III.15, AW 396b).

The Heraclitean response, though affective in the wax example, is unavailable in the water case.
The exact same water displays the incompatible properties.
If we are going to base our knowledge on our sense experiences, we have to have some account of the error that will not force us to abandon all sense experience.
That is the role to which Locke puts the primary/secondary distinction.
Let's see how he argues for it.

Consider an apple.
We might have the following ideas of the apple:

> Red
> Round
> Cool to the touch
> Sweet, though a bit sour
> Shiny
> Smooth
> Sits still on the table
> Crunchy
> Weighs 4 oz.
> Has a mass of 120 grams
> Is one apple
> Is being considered by you
> Smells like, well, an apple

Locke tacitly presumes, I think, two principles to distinguish veridical ideas from misrepresentative ones.
The first principle is destructive, yielding misrepresentative properties.

> LP1: If one perceives an object as having two (or more) incompatible ideas, then those ideas do not represent real properties of the object.

Besides hot and cold, other sense ideas are not veridical, according to LP1.
The example of porphyry in the dark (II.VIII.19) shows that color is a secondary quality.
Taste and odor are shown secondary by LP1, because an almond changes taste and odor when mashed (II.VIII.20).
Applying LP1 to Descartes's wax example, we can see that we have ideas of secondary qualities in all five sense modalities.

Consider tasting orange juice before and after brushing your teeth.
What tasted sweet before, tastes sour (for want of a better word) after.
Thus, the sweetness and sourness are not real qualities of the orange juice.
The orange juice example leads to a corollary to the first principle:

> LP1C1: Even if a change in us entails the change in the perceived quality, the ideas which change can not be veridical.

Now, consider the color impressions of a normal-sighted person and a color-blind person.
The differences show, once again, that color is not a real quality of an object.
We can infer a second corollary:

> LP1C2: Qualities that appear different to different observers are not veridical.

The above principle and its corollaries support Locke's primary/secondary distinction by allowing Locke to account for sense error.
Locke's second principle is constructive, yielding veridical properties.

> LP2: If an idea of an object is the same under all conditions, that idea is veridical.

LP1 and LP2 allow us to distinguish among our sense experiences.
Some sense experience is veridical, and can be trusted.
Some sense experience is misrepresentative, and can not be trusted.

> We may understand how it is possible that the same water may, at the same time, produce the sensations of heat in one hand and cold in the other; which yet figure never does, that, never producing the *idea* of a square by one hand, which has produced the *idea* of a globe by another (II.VIII.21, AW 335b).

The second principle also has a corollary.

> LP2C: If every observer receives the same idea from an object, then that idea is veridical.

Let's apply the principles to our apple

Red	Misrepresentative
Round	Real
Cool to the touch	Misrepresentative
Sweet, though a bit sour	Misrepresentative
Shiny	Misrepresentative
Smooth	Misrepresentative
Sits still on the table	Real
Crunchy	Misrepresentative (But maybe real, if we consider its brittle texture)
Weighs 4 oz.	Misrepresentative
Has a mass of 120 grams	Real
Is one apple	Real
Is being considered by you	Misrepresentative
Smells like an apple	Misrepresentative

Thus, we have arrived at the primary/secondary distinction via argument:

> These I call *original* or *primary qualities* of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple *ideas* in us, namely, solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. *Secondly*, such *qualities* which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their *primary qualities*...these I call *secondary qualities* (II.VIII.9-10, AW 333a-b).

Primary Qualities	Secondary Qualities
Solidity	Color
Extension	Odor
Figure	Hot/ Cold
Motion/ Rest	Sound
Number	Texture
	Taste

Locke continues to classify as tertiary ideas those that we impute to an object on the basis of its power to change the appearance of another object.
He uses the example of the power of the sun to make wax white.
We need not concern ourselves with tertiary qualities.
No one takes the tertiary qualities to be real properties of an object.
The point of appealing to the primary/secondary distinction is to show that empiricism is possible, that we can justify our beliefs on the basis of sense experience without worrying that we will be forced to accept errors as true because we are relying on our senses, rather than pure reason.

I believe that LP2 and LP2C accurately reflect Locke's intentions.
But, Locke can be sloppy in his discussions of the veridical properties.

> Qualities thus considered in bodies are, first, such as are utterly inseparable from the body in whatever state it is, such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps, and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself singly perceived by our senses - e.g., take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has still *solidity*, *extension*, *figure*, and *mobility*; divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on until the parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all those qualities (II.VIII.9, AW 333a).

Here, one worries that Locke's examples undermine his claims.
If we divide the grain of wheat in half, it has half the extension.
Thus, extension seems unstable.
The change in the taste of an almond upon mashing was supposed to show that taste is a secondary quality.
So, why doesn't the change in extension of the wheat show that extension is a secondary quality?
Locke's claim is that any divisions will not remove extension, or solidity, or shape, even if it alters those qualities.
These properties of the wheat contrast with the way objects lose all color in the dark, and the way that the wax can lose its odor and flavor.

The wheat still has a size and a shape.
But, with enough division, the primary qualities may lose even, say, shape.
Do electrons have shape?
Certainly, the solidity of an object will change after enough division.
I think that Locke was being bit sloppy here, but there may be a better explanation.
In any case, I set the worry aside to look at the ramifications of the primary/secondary distinction.

III. The Primary/Secondary Distinction, the Resemblance Hypothesis, and Empiricism

Locke presents the primary/secondary distinction in defense of his claim that we can justify our beliefs without appeal to innate ideas.
Putting skepticism aside, Descartes's strongest argument against the veridicality of sense experience relied on his examples of the wax and the sun in support of his rejection of the Resemblance Hypothesis.
While the primary/secondary distinction preceded even Descartes, Locke's use of the distinction in the service of his empiricism, and arguments in its support, are the reasons why we tend to attribute the distinction to Locke.
The primary/secondary distinction allows Locke to defend a weakened version of the Resemblance Hypothesis.

Locke accepts the Resemblance Hypothesis, for primary qualities only.

> The *ideas of primary qualities* of bodies *are resemblances* of them and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the *ideas produced* in us *by* these *secondary qualities have no resemblance* of them at all. There is nothing like our *ideas* existing in the bodies themselves (II.VIII.15, AW 334a).

Our ideas of extension resemble extension in the world.
For example, I have an idea that this piece of paper is 11 inches long.
So, the paper really is 11 inches long.
My idea of the motion of a car resembles the real motion of that car.
The car really is moving.
My ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble anything in an object.

On the basis of my ideas of primary qualities, then, I can justify significant conclusions about the world (i.e. the new science) without appealing to innate ideas.

Note that Locke and Descartes do not disagree substantially about the nature of the physical world.
We should expect this, since both Descartes and Locke were writing in support of modern science.
Descartes believes that the essential characteristic of physical objects is extension, whereas Locke believes that extension is just one of several primary qualities.
They disagree more strongly about how we know about those properties.
Their disagreement is epistemological, not metaphysical.

The metaphysical upshot of the primary/secondary distinction, then, is that the world is nothing but particles in motion, and that the sense qualities of objects are not really in the world.
I had mentioned this conclusion when we discussed Hobbes, and promised to return to it.
Lemons are not really yellow, or sour.
They are made of particles (atoms or corpuscles) that appear yellow or sour to normal human senses.

These minute particles unite in varying ways.
Depending on how they unite, they affect us in different ways.
Their arrangement determines how we experience an object.
The lemon can take on other appearances, in other circumstances, to other observers, who will all agree on the size and shape of the lemon.
We might say that the lemon has a 'dispositional property' which makes us see it as yellow.
But the dispositional property is not yellowness, which is, properly speaking, a property only of my experience.
We have ideas which arise from the interaction between our senses and the material world.
The material world exists independently of us, and has its primary qualities truly, but depends on us for sensory (secondary) properties.

Here's Galileo again on the primary/secondary distinction:

> ...that external bodies, to excite in us these tastes, these odours, and these sounds, demand other than size, figure, number, and slow or rapid motion, I do not believe, and I judge that, if the ears, the tongue, and the nostrils were taken away, the figure, the numbers, and the motions would indeed remain, but not the odours, nor the tastes, nor the sounds, which, without the living animal, I do not believe are anything else than names (*Opere* IV, 336).

Compare Galileo's formulation to Locke's:

> Take away the sensation of them; let the eyes not see light, or colors, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell; and all colors, tastes, odors, and sounds as they are such particular *ideas* vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e., bulk, figure, and motion of parts (II.VIII.17, AW 334b).

So, why do the lemons appear yellow?
For both the moderns and contemporary neuroscientists, we lack an explanation of the connection between my quale and its cause.
Why is it that such and such motions in the air cause me to hear a symphony?
Why is it that certain wavelengths of light cause me to see blue?

> That the size, figure, and motion of one body should cause a change in the size, figure, and motion of another body is not beyond our conception. The separation of the parts of one body upon the intrusion of another and the change from rest to motion upon impulse, these and the like seem to have some *connection* one with another. And if we knew these primary qualities of bodies, we might have reason to hope we might be able to know a great deal more of these operations of them one upon another. But our minds not being able to discover any *connection* between these primary qualities of bodies and the sensations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted rules of the consequence or *coexistence* of any secondary qualities, though we could discover the size, figure, or motion of those invisible parts which immediately produce them. We are so far from knowing what figure, size, or motion of parts produce a yellow color, a sweet taste, ro a sharp sound that we can by no means conceive how any *size, figure*, or *motion* of any particles can possibly produce in us the *idea* of any *color*, *taste*, or *sound* whatsoever; there is no conceivable *connection* between the one and the other (IV.III.13).

If your parents are giving you a hard time about studying philosophy, since it never makes any progress, you might want to keep them away from that quote.
It's the kind of thing that gives people like me nightmares.
We really haven't made any progress in the last three centuries of trying to answer that question.
That question is essentially what David Chalmers calls the hard problem of consciousness.
The easy problem is to map the brain, and to know all its functions.
Once we have done that, though, we still won't be any closer to an answer to why certain neural firings correspond to certain conscious experiences.

IV. The Mind-Body Problem

While Locke was suspected of Hobbesian materialism, he is clearly a dualist, accepting the existence of the soul and God, as well as material objects.
So, Locke, like Descartes, is saddled with a mind-body problem.
The slight metaphysical differences between Locke and Descartes do nothing to change the essential nature of the problem.
Given what Locke says about the primary qualities, we can see that bodies have several essential properties, not merely extension.
Similarly, minds are not essentially thinking; they are just the kinds of things that do think.
Still, nothing in these changes in the characterizations of each substance mitigates the problem.

Locke does not provide a Cartesian-style solution to the mind-body problem, despairing of any satisfactory account.
His discussion of mind-body interaction is humble, though, rather than skeptical.

> Supposing the sensation or idea we name whiteness be produced in us by a certain number of globules, which, having a verticity about their own centres, strike upon the retina of the eye, with a certain degree of rotation, as well as progressive swiftness; it will hence easily follow, that the more the superficial parts of any body are so ordered as to reflect the greater number of globules of light, and to give them the proper rotation, which is fit to produce this sensation of white in us, the more white will that body appear, that from an equal space sends to the retina the greater number of such corpuscles, with that peculiar sort of motion... I cannot (and I would be glad any one would make intelligible that he did), conceive how bodies without us can any ways affect our senses, but by the immediate contact of the sensible bodies themselves, as in tasting and feeling, or the impulse of some sensible particles coming from them, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; by the different impulse of which parts, caused by their different size, figure, and motion, the variety of sensations is produced in us (IV.II.11).

Locke describes how the communication of motion of light to the retina will impel us to see a color, without any serious metaphysical speculation about the communication of motion.
Locke's claim is merely that there are lawful correspondences between physical events and some mental states.
But he provides no explanation of why a particular wavelength of light should correspond to a particular color, or why the vibration of the ear at should correspond to the sound it does.
If these lawful correspondences are possible, it seems possible for matter to think.
Moreover, it seems equally unlikely for whatever substance in which thought resides to be the seat of thought as for matter to be the seat of thought.

> We have the *ideas* of *matter* and *thinking*, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or not, it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own *ideas*, without revelation, to discover whether omnipotence has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed a thinking immaterial substance - it being in respect of our notions not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking than that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking, since we do not know in what thinking consists, nor to what sort of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power... (IV.III.6, AW 393b).

Locke thus draws a humble conclusion.

> *The extent of our knowledge* comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extend of our own *ideas* (IV.III.6, AW 393a).

The materialist and the dualist each make the error of claiming to know something that is beyond the reach of our ideas.

V. Personal Identity

The question of how to define or characterize personal identity, what identifies us or makes us the same over time, is deep and compelling.
Questions of identity are perennially tricky, even for artifacts.
Consider the ship of Theseus.
We can replace every plank on the ship, one at a time.
It changes its material composition completely, but remains the same ship.
We can make a new ship with the old wood, and find ourselves completely confused about what to say.
Is the ship that Theseus uses, with all new materials, his ship?
Or, is the new ship made of the old wood his ship?
We will look only briefly at the subject of personal identity, but Prof. Janack teaches a full course on the topic.
Locke's discussion of personal identity is especially subtle, since he distinguishes our selves from both the soul (to which Descartes identified the self) and the matter of our bodies (to which materialists like Hobbes identified the self).
He takes the self, or sameness of person, to be a forensic term, used for practical purposes of ascribing responsibility.

Locke begins his account of the self by noting that identity is relative to a sortal, to a kind of thing.
Let's say that my daughter re-forms her plasticine sculpture of a horse into the shape of a house.
The lump of plasticine is the same lump, but it is a different statue.
We can not know how to identify something unless we know what kind of thing it is.
So, we can not know what our identity is until we know what kind of thing we are.
There are three main types of thing, for Locke and Descartes: God, finite minds (souls), and bodies.
These categories are too coarse to help us identify our selves.
The same mass of matter may be a different statue while being the same toy.
An animal is not merely its matter; the matter remains after death while the animal does not.

Locke takes 'man', or 'human being', to be a type of animal, whose identity (qua human being) is determined functionally.

> The identity of the same *man* consists...in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body (II.XXVII.6, AW 369a).

This sort, human being, can not serve as the sort of our selves.
A human is identified by the functional organization of the body; it is a biological thing.
But, a person is not a biological thing.

> [A person] is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places, which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it... (II.XXVII.9, AW 370a).

'Person' is a moral category.
One can see an argument for the distinction between humans and persons clearly when we consider the question of whether aliens, or sentient machines, could be persons.
Since such a case is possible, our personhood must not be identical with our biology.
Locke's prince, who transfers his consciousness to a cobbler, retains his personhood, even though he inhabits, so to speak, a different human being.

Since biological criteria will not suffice to identify the self, an obvious alternative is Descartes's claim that we are essentially thinking things, our souls.
Locke emphasizes that the defender of the soul says that the body in which the soul is placed is inconsequential, so that the same soul could be put into two bodies.

> Souls [are], as far as we know anything of them, in their nature, indifferent to any parcel of matter... (§II.XXVII.14, AW 372a).

Imagine that a soul had two successive incarnations.
We wouldn't say that there were only one person.

> Suppose it to be the same soul that was in *Nestor* or *Thersites* at the siege of *Troy*...which it may have been, as well as it is now the soul of any other man. But he now having no consciousness of any of the actions of either of *Nestor* or *Thersites*, does or can he conceive himself the same person with either of them? Can he be concerned in either of their actions, attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the actions of any other men that ever existed? Thus, this consciousness not reaching to any of the actions of either of those men, he is no more one self with either of them than if the soul or immaterial spirit that now informs him had been created and began to exist, when it began to inform his present body... (II.XXVII.14, AW 372a).

Locke has separated the soul from the thinking thing, and identified the self with the thinking thing.

If a soul were to be transferred from one body to the next, while retaining its consciousness, then, we would have the same person.

> If the same consciousness...can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person. For the same consciousness being preserved, whether in the same or different substances, the personal identity is preserved (II.XXVII.13, AW 371b).

For Locke, what makes the same person over time, is consciousness, and, especially, connection through memory, which Locke calls consciousness extending backwards.
Thus, the day and night man, who has divided consciousness, is two different persons in one body.