

Questions to Prepare for the Final Exam

Berkeley, *Principles*, Part I, §1-33 (AW 447-453)

2. What is an object, like an apple, for Berkeley?
4. How does Berkeley argue that the essence of unthinking things is their being perceived?
6. How does the notion of the independent existence of material objects depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas?
7. What kind of abstraction does Berkeley say we can perform? What can't we do, as regards abstraction?
8. Can an object which I don't perceive exist? Explain.
9. How does Berkeley argue that there can be no material substratum for our ideas?
10. Why can't our ideas of objects resemble material substance? How does this show the primary/secondary distinction to be unhelpful?
11. "In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable" (§10, AW 449a). Explain. What does this show?
13. Explain Berkeley's argument against the primary qualities from the relativity of perceptions.
16. "In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now" (§20, AW 451a). Explain.
22. Distinguish real things and images.

Berkeley, *Three Dialogues*, Dialogue 1 (AW 454-474)

24. How does Hylas first define 'skeptical'? Why does Philonous claim to be no skeptic?
32. "Colors, sounds, tastes, in a word, all those termed 'secondary qualities,' have certainly no existence without the mind. But by this acknowledgment I must not be supposed to derogate anything from the reality of matter or external objects..." (AW 464b). Explain. Who, besides Hylas, holds this view?
33. How does Philonous plan to argue against the primary qualities?
34. How does the example of the mite show the relativity of extension?
36. How does a microscope serve to show that the appearance of figure can change?
37. What is the relation between motion and time? How is time measured? What does this mean for motion?
43. "Consequently, the very same arguments which you admitted as conclusive against the secondary qualities are... against the primary, too" (AW 468a). Explain.

Berkeley, *Principles*, Introduction (AW 438-446)

54. What "abuse of language" is a chief part of philosophical confusion?
56. "But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and color" (§10, AW 441a). Explain. How is this an argument against abstract ideas?
58. Does our ability to understand and use general propositions entail an ability to form abstract ideas?
60. How does the notion of an abstract, general idea lead to a contradiction?

Berkeley, *Principles*, §86-100 (Handout)

66. How does materialism lead to skepticism? How does idealism avoid skepticism?
67. Do we have ideas of ourselves? Explain.
69. How does materialism lead to atheism?

Berkeley, *Three Dialogues*, Dialogue 2 (AW 474-484)

72. “Men commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by God, because they believe the being of a God; whereas I, on the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him” (AW 477a). Explain. (See also *Principles* §146 et seq.)
75. Do we need matter to explain our perceptions? Explain.

Berkeley, *Principles*, §101-156 (Handout)

78. How does natural science lead to skepticism?
79. “I do not perceive that anything is signified [by ‘gravitational attraction’] besides the effect itself” (§103). Explain.
84. According to Berkeley, are mathematical theorems true? Are there numbers? Explain.
86. “There is no such thing as the ten-thousandth part of an *inch*; but there is of a *mile* or *diameter of the earth*, which may be signified by that inch” (§127). Explain. How does this indicate the basic error of the notion of infinite divisibility, for Berkeley?
91. What does uniformity in nature show? What do blemishes in nature show?

Hume, *Enquiry*, §I-§IV (AW 533-548)

3. Distinguish ideas from impressions. From where do ideas come?
4. “What was never seen or heard of, may yet be conceived, nor is anything beyond the power of thought except what implies an absolute contradiction” (§II, AW 539b). Explain.
5. How does Hume argue that all ideas are derived from impressions?
7. How can we determine, according to Hume, whether a philosophical term is meaningless?
9. Distinguish relations of ideas from matters of fact. How do we learn propositions that are solely concerned with relations of ideas?
12. How do we learn to connect specific causes with their effects? How can we not learn this, according to Hume?
13. How does Hume argue that effects can not be discovered by examining their causes?
14. What are the goals of science, the “utmost effort of human reason” (§IV.1, AW 544a)?
15. “Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy...” (§IV.1, AW 544b). Explain. Why does Hume make this conclusion?
17. What do inferences about the future presuppose, as their foundation? Why can’t experience establish this premise?
18. Why are our attempts to learn the nature of bodies in vain?
21. What is the role of custom, or habit, in our understanding of cause and effect? Does Hume explain the cause of this cause?
28. How do we respond when a general cause and effect rule fails to apply in a particular instance? Do we assume that nature is irregular?
35. Distinguish conjunction from connection. Of which do we have knowledge?
36. Why do we call some objects causes and others effects? What gives us the feeling that there is a connection between the two?
37. How does Hume define ‘cause’?
38. “From the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers form a maxim that the connection between all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes” (§VIII.1, AW 567b). Explain.
39. Regarding their determinacy, how do human actions differ from physical interactions?
40. How does Hume define liberty? How does this definition make the debate over free will merely verbal?

41. Is liberty the opposite of necessity or constraint? Explain.
42. According to Hume, when are actions deemed blameworthy or praiseworthy? How can a necessary act be the object of praise or blame?
47. What is a miracle? Why should testimony of miracles not be convincing?
55. Why is Cartesian doubt incurable?
56. What is the proper role of a moderate skepticism? (See also §XII.3, AW 598b et seq.)
58. Why do we believe in an external universe, according to Hume?
59. Can experience verify the existence of a physical world?
61. Can we prove the existence of an external world? Explain.
63. "The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism, is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life" (§XII.2, AW 597b). Explain.
66. "When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make?" (§XII.3, AW 600b).

Hume, *Treatise*, Book I, Part IV, §6 (AW 525-532)

67. Do we have an idea of our selves? What do we think about when we think about our selves?
68. What is the self? How is the self an exemplar of diversity?
70. "Every distinct perception which enters into the composition of the mind is a distinct existence and is different and distinguishable and separable from every other perception, either contemporary or successive" (AW 529b). Explain. What does this mean for personal identity?

Kant, *Prefaces and Introduction* (AW 717-729)

2. What is logic? How are its limitations to its benefit as a science?
5. Does our cognition conform to objects, or do objects conform to our cognition? Explain. Consider Copernicus's revolution.
6. Can we cognize beyond the limits of possible experience? Explain.
7. Why are topics like God, freedom, and immortality inaccessible to reason? How does Kant deny knowledge in order to make room for faith?
8. Distinguish analytic and synthetic judgments. Why are experiential judgments all synthetic?
9. How is 'every effect has a cause' synthetic? How is it *a priori*?
10. How are some mathematical propositions synthetic *a priori*?
12. How are metaphysical propositions synthetic *a priori*?
13. How does Kant disagree with Hume about mathematics? How does the disagreement provide hope for mathematics?
15. Distinguish sensibility from understanding.

Kant, *Transcendental Aesthetic* (AW 729-737)

16. What are intuitions? How do they differ from concepts?
20. Is space an abstraction from outer experiences? How does it underlie outer experiences?
22. What is a transcendental exposition of a concept? How does Kant provide a transcendental exposition of space?
23. Are things-in-themselves in space? Explain.
25. How does Kant argue that our knowledge of time cannot be obtained from experience?

Kant, *Transcendental Analytic: Analytic of Concepts* (AW 737-756)

30. "Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind" (A51/B76, AW 737b). Explain.
33. How is synthesis of a manifold what first gives rise to cognition? What is pure synthesis?

36. How does Kant praise and criticize Locke regarding a deduction of pure concepts of the understanding?
40. What is a combination of the manifold of representations? How is it missing from a merely sensible intuition?
42. Describe the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception. How is it the supreme principle of human understanding?
44. Distinguish 'if I support this body, then I feel a pressure of heaviness' from 'this body is heavy'. Which is objectively valid?
49. How could the applicability of the categories make nature possible?

Kant, *Refutation of Idealism* (AW 781-783)

56. Distinguish dogmatic idealism from problematic idealism. How does Kant reject dogmatic idealism?
57. How does Kant reject problematic idealism?

Kant, *On the Ontological Argument* (AW 819-823)

76. What is Kant's distinction between a logical predicate and a real predicate? Why is 'is omnipotent' a real predicate, while 'exists' is merely a logical predicate?
77. "A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers" (A599/B627, AW 822a). Explain. Why not?
78. How does Kant's distinction between logical and real predicates demonstrate a flaw in the ontological argument?