“Meaning”
IBS- Intention Based Semantics
By: Grice
PRIOR THEORIES

- Lockean Veil of Perception: Are we in the box?
- Wittgenstein: We are IN the world and thus, we experience the world directly.
- Kripkenstein: There is NO meaning, ONLY meaningfulness as a function of public rules.
- Grice: There is still meaning and it lies in intention.
...we may sum up what is necessary for A to mean something by X as follows. A must intend to induce by x a belief in an audience and he must also intend his utterance to be recognized as so intended. But these intentions are not independent; the recognition is intended by A to play its part in inducing the belief, and if it does not do so something will have gone wrong with the fulfillment of A's intentions” (383).
# Natural and Non-natural Senses of Perception

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Sense</th>
<th>Non-Natural Sense</th>
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<td>“A means (meant) to do so-and-so (by x)” (378)</td>
<td>“A means (meant) something by x”</td>
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- **Five Characteristics**

1. We conclude that “X means P” entails p
2. We CANNOT conclude that what was meant by “X” was P
3. We CANNOT conclude that someone/anyone meant anything by X
4. “‘The fact that’” serves as an “approximate restatement”
5. We CANNOT find a “restatement” with the “verb ‘mean’” and “inverted commas”
Objections to Causal Theory (circularity)

- Grice rejects C.L. Stevenson’s claim that in order “for $x$ to mean [in the nonnatural sense] something, $x$ must have (roughly) a tendency to produce in an audience some attitude (cognitive or otherwise) and a tendency, in the case of the speaker to be produced by that attitude” (379-8)

- Causal theory only covers “standard”/”general” meaning of signs while meaning deals in particulars” (381)
Isolated Intention as Insufficient

- “[I]f x was intended by its utterer to induce a belief in some ‘audience,’ and that to say what the belief was would be to say what x meant NN. This will not do” (381).

- i.e.: Handkerchief at murder scene
Intention and Recognition as Sufficient Conditions

- “meaningNN requires intention of speaker for audience to recognize intention of utterance to be understood.

- “A meantNN something by x” means “A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention.” (385)

- “x meant something” means/is equivalent to “somebody meantNN something by x” (385)

- i.e.: Showing photograph versus drawing
Imperative Cases

- In the imperative examples, the utterer/speaker/actor does “not intend [the audience’s] recognition” (384).
- Examples:
  a. “avaricious” man
  b. Police’s methods of stopping a car
Primary Intentions

- Only primary intentions are considered part of meaning of utterances.

- “For if I utter x, intending (with the aid of the recognition of this intention) to induce an effect E, and intend this effect E to lead to a further effect F, then insofar as the occurrence of F is thought to be dependent solely on E. I cannot regard F as in the least dependent on recognition of my intention to induce E” (386).

- Sean’s Court case example.
Clarifications

- Traffic lights example: always distantly connected with intention
- Philosopher’s case: “A philosopher asked to explain the meaning of an unclear passage in one of his works), the answer is not based on what he remembers but is more like a decision, a decision about how what he said is to be taken” (387)
Ambiguous Recognitions of Intentions

- Spontaneous versus Deliberate Smiles
- Oral Exams
  - Would Grice argue that this is not real communication.