

Kripke's Naming and Necessity

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Descriptivism

- Simple

- Frege

(*sense*)

- Russell

(*abbreviational*)

- Cluster


- Strawson

- Searle

(influenced by Strawson, dude
who Kripke specifically goes
after)

Outline of Kripke's views on Descriptivism

Simple



Frege - the sense of names is in their implied meanings

Monday is the day that comes before Tuesday.

X is P

Because we use P as a definition of X

Knowable a priori

[duh]

Simple



Russell - proper names are abbreviations
for descriptions

Aristotle was a student of Plato.


X is (was) P

...if X is an abbreviation for, among other
things, P

Assuming this, also knowable 'a priori'

[also duh]


HOWEVER:



According to Frege and Russell, the name, 'Aristotle' means or abbreviates (respectively) the description, 'was a student of Plato'. Thus that fact should be immediately discernable, or a priori

In this case, X is P is contingent fact, demanding prior knowledge that P is a descriptor of X (And that X is, in fact, an abbreviation for P)

...which makes the statement only knowable 'a posteriori'



Negates Simple Descriptivism

Cluster

Strawson - more sophisticated theory, influenced Searle

[thus fancier name]

Given by several points:

apparently true

1. A name $[N]$ is associated with a set $[\varphi]$ of \wedge descriptions
 2. These descriptions are believed to be of only one individual
 3. If $[Y]$ has most of these φ , then N refers to Y
 4. However, if nothing matches up to φ , then N has no reference
 5. The statement, " N has φ " is known a priori
 6. The statement, " N has φ " is a necessary truth (to the speaker)
- C. If this is gonna work, none of φ can refer separately

So...does this actually work out?

Let's find out!

(Kripke)



No.

Beefs with Descriptivism



First, regarding Donnellan...

Acknowledges view that reference is still successful, even under false pretenses

- Man in corner drinking 'martini'


Also works for names, as well as descriptions

- Two men observing 'Jones'



Beefs with Descriptivism

"What if everything I think I know about [X] guy is a lie?"



If some descriptions are wrong, cluster desc. still works

But if everything is wrong, then rule 4:

4. However, if nothing matches up to Φ , then N has no reference
would say that I can't refer

...but I still believe I'm referring to X..."

Beefs with Descriptivism

Examples!

(in order of rules, not pages...sorry)

Calls #1 a definition


1. A name $[N]$ is associated with a set $[\varphi]$ of descriptions
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Beefs with Descriptivism

Examples!

2. These descriptions are believed to be of only one individual

...seems pretty implicit...if not, who are you talking about? X or Y?



Well, it happens...a lot.

Take Richard Feynmann [p. 206]:


- Some refer to him by his specific achievements, which distinguish him as one individual
- The rest of us would say 'some physicist'
 - This claim describes both him individually, and many other physicists (Rule 2 is not satisfied)
 - Yet we would still be referring to the one and only R. Feynmann, just without the ability to distinguish him further

Beefs with Descriptivism

Examples!

3. If $[Y]$ has most of these φ , then N refers to Y

"Now, since we have already established that Thesis 2 is wrong, why should any of the rest work? The whole theory depended on always being able to specify unique conditions which are satisfied. But we can still look at the other theses" (207).



[p. 207/8]

If one knows Gödel, but can only attribute to him the discovery of the incompleteness of arithmetic ("He wrote [whatever] theorem"), then Kripke would have one imagine that the discovery was actually stolen from a man named, "Schmidt".

So, not only would Gödel not be the best 'Y' to attribute φ to, but in fact he would be the worst option; Schmidt would be the best Y.

Beefs with Descriptivism

Examples!

3. If $[Y]$ has most of these φ , then N refers to Y



Rule 3 would then say that, "Since the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic is in fact Schmidt, we, when we talk about Gödel, are in fact always referring to Schmidt. But it seems to me that we are not. We simply are not" (208).

Similar, too, is the Biblical story of Jonah. [p. 207]

- Experts believe that the Biblical Jonah really existed
- There is no way he was swallowed by a fish.
- But yet Jonah $[N]$ still very much has reference

Oh! How convenient!

4. However, if nothing matches up to φ , then N has no reference

Beefs with Descriptivism

Examples!


5. The statement, "N has φ " is known a priori
6. The statement, "N has φ " is a necessary truth (to the speaker)

Kripke outright disagrees. He has a point.

He cites a theory, maybe used by some philosophers or historians about certain individuals who are predestined for greatness straight from birth. Like Freddie Mercury.

If, for example, *Aristotle* were to be predestined in such a way, Rules 5 and 6 would apply very nicely to Aristotle (as N)

Unfortunately, the debate over Freddie Mercury's (and Aristotle's) predetermined greatness is wasted on a theory about the reference of proper names.



<- Aristotle

Beefs with Descriptivism


Examples!

5. The statement, "N has φ " is known a priori
6. The statement, "N has φ " is a necessary truth (to the speaker)

The fact that Aristotle did great things and contributed to modern society is a completely *contingent* one, and therefore cannot be known a priori or taken as a necessary truth at all.

So where does that leave us?

1. A name $[N]$ is associated with a set $[\varphi]$ of descriptions
2. ~~These descriptions are believed to be of only one individual~~
3. ~~If $[Y]$ has most of these φ , then N refers to Y~~
4. ~~However, if nothing matches up to φ , then N has no reference~~
5. ~~The statement, " N has φ " is known a priori~~
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is gonna work, none of φ can refer separately

LOL

Crowd Question

I really dunno...

Does Kripke really get to pull this off?