

Final Exam

This exam consists of one question. Your response to this question must refer to at least eight of the readings we have discussed this term, listed below. You may choose to refer to more readings. I will judge the quality of your response both on the depth of the analysis of each reading and the connections you make among the readings.

This is a closed-book exam with one exception: during the exam you may consult the copy of your précis that you submit and I return. You may type your exams on a computer, wherever you wish to work. You may take the exam during any three-hour block of exam week. Please bring me a hard copy of the finished exam by the end of the College's exam period.

The Question: Is the use of philosophical intuitions in philosophy defensible?

In answering the question, you might want to appeal to answers to the following subordinate questions:

What are philosophical intuitions?

How are philosophical intuitions different from other thoughts or cognitive episodes?

What is the method of reflective equilibrium?

How is reflective equilibrium both a methodological counsel and an epistemic thesis?

How does the method of seeking reflective, as an epistemic thesis, differ from foundationalism and coherentism?

What is the scientific method? How does the method of seeking reflective equilibrium, as a methodological counsel, differ from the scientific method?

What is experimental philosophy? How does it differ from traditional philosophy?

Is philosophy a normative discipline?

The readings for the term are listed on the next page/reverse, for your convenience.

## The Readings

### Part I:

Brown and Fehige, "Thought Experiments"

Descartes, selections from *Meditations on First Philosophy* and *Objections and Replies*

Locke, "Clear and Distinct Perception"

Hume, selections from *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*

Melchert, "Analysis"

Ayer, "Are Mistakes About One's Own Immediate Experience Only Verbal?"

Sellars, "Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?"

Goodman, "The New Riddle of Induction"

Papineau, "Methodology: The Elements of the Philosophy of Science," §1, §3, and §5

Rawls, from *A Theory of Justice*

Chomsky, from *Knowledge of Language*, Chapters 1 and 2

### Part II:

Tversky and Kahneman, "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases"

McNerney, "Shifting Paradigms"

Cohen, "Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?"

Replies from Evans and Pollard; Kahneman; and Stich

Stich and Nisbett, "Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning"

### Part III:

Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich, "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions" (EP 2)

Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich, "Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style" (EP 3)

Woolfolk, Doris, and Darley, "Identification, Situation Constraint, and Social Cognition: Studies in Attribution of Moral Responsibility" (EP 4)

Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner, "Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?" (EP 5)

Nichols and Knobe, "Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions" (EP 6)

Knobe, "The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology" (EP7)

Gendler, "Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium"

Buckwalter and Stich, "Gender and Philosophical Intuition"

Prinz, "Empirical Philosophy and Experimental Philosophy" (EP 10)

Buckwalter and Stich, "Gender and Philosophical Intuition"

### Part IV:

Gopnik and Schwitzgebel, "Whose Concepts Are They, Anyway? The Role of Philosophical Intuition in Empirical Psychology" (DR 5)

Cummins, "Reflections on Reflective Equilibrium" (DR7)

Bealer, "Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy" (DR 12)

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Kornblith, "The Role of Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry: An Account with No Unnatural Ingredients" (DR 8)

Sosa, "Minimal Intuition" (DR 14) and "Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition" (EP 12)

DePaul, "Why Bother with Reflective Equilibrium?" (DR 16)