



Naming and Necessity **by Saul Kripke**

Colin Hostetter






Non-Essential Properties

- Most properties are not essential to who we are.
- You would be the same person with a different haircut, or an amputated limb, or if you never came to Hamilton.
- But **are there essential properties?** Are there things about us that are so important that changing them changes our identity on this fundamental level?

The Queen Problem



- Would the Queen (or anyone else) still be the same person if she was born from different parents?
- We can imagine that somehow she was switched at birth and it was revealed that her parents were some Mr. and Mrs. Truman. That wouldn't change her identity; she'd still be the same person.
- But that's not what Kripke is wondering, because in that case the Trumans were her parents all along.



The Queen Problem



- Assume that our Elizabeth II really is of the Windsor lineage. But now consider an alternate world in which Elizabeth II was actually the child of the Trumans and somehow became Queen.
- Would this be the same person as the Elizabeth II we know and love?
- According to Kripke, our intuition says that she can't possibly be the same person, even if she had the same name, appearance, title, and so on.




Ancestry




- If that's the case, it seems that **ancestry is an essential property of identity**.
- Changing something's ancestry means that you change something fundamental about it.
- “It seems to me that anything coming from a different origin would not be this object” (Kripke 223).
- Does this property also apply to inanimate objects, or only to people?

The Table Example



- Kripke gives the example of the wooden table he is writing on.
- He, of course, does not know exactly which block of wood the table is made from—but, nevertheless, what if it was made from a different block of wood?
- It seems to Kripke that if even if he made a second table from a different block of wood, and it was totally indistinguishable from the first table, it still would not be the same table.





The Big Questions

- What does this mean for Reid and his principle of irreducible identity? Does this contradict it?
- Does this mean that who we are is reducible entirely to our ancestry? Or are there other essential properties?
- What about our sex, our gender identity, our core beliefs? Do these have the same strength as Kripke's ancestry example?