

Philosophy 101: Introduction to Philosophy, Queens College, Spring 2005  
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Lecture Notes, March 23

## I. Locke, on the Resemblance Hypothesis

Locke accepts RH for primary qualities.  
He rejects it for secondary qualities.  
See §II.VIII.15.

## II. Three metaphysical positions

1) Materialism: All reality is material.  
This would have to include the mental.  
Thus, a materialist might say that the mind is the brain.  
Hobbes was a materialist, though Locke was not.

2) Dualism: Some reality is mental, some is physical.  
Descartes and Locke are both dualists, though we read Locke more as a materialist.  
Note that God is taken as a mental object, an infinite thinker.

3) Idealism: All reality is mental  
Berkeley holds this view.  
See §9.

Note that these metaphysical positions are independent of one's epistemology.  
Locke and Descartes agree on dualism, despite their disagreement over epistemology.  
And Berkeley disagrees with Locke about metaphysics, though he mostly agrees about epistemology.

Compare with this, from Locke, from the Introduction, §4-§5, to the *Enquiry*:  
If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities... The discoveries we can make with this ought to satisfy us; and we shall then use our understandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are suited to our faculties, and upon those grounds they are capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do much as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly.

Read Introduction, §1-§6.

The beginning of the Introduction is a rejection of Descartes' work.  
Berkeley says that we have prejudices, errors and paradoxes.  
They are wrongly thought to arise from our natural weakness and limitations.  
Materialism, and the materialist element of dualism, leads to skepticism.  
But this is an unjustified skepticism.  
We can avoid these problems, which arise from raising dust and complaining we can not see.

Berkeley is more concerned with the kinds of problems that Locke mentions with the Cartesian philosophy.  
The rest of the Introduction contains an extended attack on Locke's doctrine of abstract ideas.  
Do not accept the "largest views", false principles.  
The problem is 'abstract ideas'.

Remember, Locke relied on the doctrine of abstract ideas to respond to Descartes.  
Locke wanted to account for all of our knowledge, starting from a blank slate.  
To account for our knowledge of mathematics, he needed to rely on an ability to abstract, or generalize, from experience with ordinary objects and inscriptions.  
Berkeley points out that Locke needs this ability to account for any name which does not refer to a particular sensation.

For Locke, we abstract the triangularity of triangular-shaped drawings from their specific properties: the chalk, the slight curve in one side, the location on the board.  
We focus only on the fact that they are, in some sense, triangular.

Berkeley urges that the posit of a material world arises from the same sort of abstraction.  
One method of abstraction involves abstracting existence from perception.

### III. How the doctrine of abstract ideas leads to belief in physical objects.

Read §4-§5.  
Recall Locke's analysis of ideas as images.  
This is just the representational theory of the mind: words stand for ideas which represent the world.

Berkeley considers an apple, §1.  
We call something an apple if it has the sensory properties we associate with apples.  
So, our term 'apple' refers to those ideas.

What about the idea of man?  
No image will do.  
For, would it be an image of a short man, or a tall man?  
Of a hairy man, or of a bald man?