

Philosophy 101: Introduction to Philosophy, Queens College, Fall 2004  
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## I. Habit, and the mental interpretation of cause and effect

Why do we believe that there are connections between events?  
Why do we exit through the door, not the window?

Hume argues that this is just habit, p 50.  
We make a mental leap, unjustified by evidence.  
Consider if man were suddenly brought into world, p 27-8.  
Consider Hume's definition of cause, p 51.  
Notice that Hume makes this a mental phenomenon, not an external one, pp 35-6.  
So, there are no causes in nature, but only in our minds.

[Contrast with Frege's criticism of psychologism in *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, if you are feeling ambitious.  
§§25-27 are applicable to the work we have done.]

Hume says he strongly believes the laws, anyway, pp 38-9.  
He asserts that there is no chance in nature, p 37.  
He worries about determinism, in Section VIII.  
We rely on science and evidence, p 73.  
He argues against miracles, and for uniformity in nature, pp 76-7.  
We also know of the existence of the universe.  
All of this is mere unjustifiable habit, p 104.

Berkeley claims that views like those of Hume lead to skepticism.  
Hume agrees, in a way, but denies that it leads to immorality. (See Section VIII.)  
Hume sees skepticism as practically defeasible, p 109.  
That is, in practice, we are not skeptics.  
Extreme skepticism is self-refuting, p 103, and p 110.

## II. Three problems of induction

1. Weak problem of induction:  
We have limited intelligence and experience.  
There is not enough evidence to draw the conclusions that we draw.  
But if we were smarter or had more time, we could solve the problem.  
This is not Hume's problem of induction.  
This problem is just a problem of bad science.

2. Strong problem of induction:  
Even given all possible evidence from the past, we can't know that the laws of nature will not shift radically and unexpectedly.  
This is Hume's problem, p 19, p22.

We do make predictions, despite the problem.  
Consider dropping a book in mid-air.  
P1: The book will rise.

P2: The book will fall.

We predict the latter, but experience can't support this.

Does God know the laws?

Are laws merely human constructs?

A possible solution: God works only in particulars, and has no need for universals.

This seems consistent with Berkeley's position.

3. New Problem of Induction

We'll discuss this on Monday.