October 28

Lecture Notes: October 28

In the following, references to the section numbers of the texts are recorded as S29, for example.

Berkeley (1685-1753) (continued)

Read Introduction, S1-S6
We have prejudices, errors and paradoxes - This sounds like Descartes.
But Berkeley is more concerned with the kinds of problems that Locke has with the Cartesian philosophy.
Also, consider this quote, from Locke, from the intro to the Enquiry:

If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities... The discoveries we can make with this ought to satisfy us; and we shall then use our understandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are suited to our faculties, and upon those grounds they are capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do much as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly. (S4-S5)

Locke believes we should accept certain limitations in our understanding, perhaps due to our natural weakness and limitations.
But this, for Berkeley, is an unjustified skepticism.
We can avoid these problems (raising dust and complaining we can not see).
Don't accept the "largest views", false principles.
The problem, for Locke, is a reliance on 'abstract ideas', and the consequent positing of a material world.

Berkeley thus attacks the whole of the new science.

Remember, that Locke and Descartes agree on much about the material world: there are physical objects with certain properties which we perceive in a confused way. Berkeley disagrees with this picture, but his focus is on the empiricism of Locke, especially.

Why do people think that there are material objects?
Reliance on the doctrine of abstract ideas: S4-s5
Recall that for Locke, ideas are as images of external objects.
Representational theory of language (and mind): words stand for ideas which represent the world
Contrast what Berkeley says about an object, the apple at S1.

It's a collection of sense impressions.

What about more general ideas, like the idea of a human?
No image will do, since it would have to be short and tall, hairy and bald, and all other qualities which we may imagine humans having.
Read Introduction, S13: many of these various qualities contradict each other.
Locke says we can abstract from the various particular ideas (of humans, for example) to that which they have in common.
To this commonality we give a name, and that's the object.
Since the name represents an idea, there must be some thing to correspond to the idea.
Consider a progression from: three men, to the concept of man, to the concept of animal, to the concept of body.
Berkeley claims that this is a progression of abstraction which leads us falsely to believe in material objects.

Start with the passing show, three chairs, e.g.
We find that there are commonalities.
We abstract to the notion of chair.
Now do the same thing for table, and we get to a more abstract notion of furniture.
Continuing we get to body, or physical object. (S99)
Also, we can progress to a notion of motion.
These are the foundations of physical science: objects and motion.
If we don't think we can abstract, then we don't posit the ideas or the objects, just the passing show.

Berkeley says that we can give a name to the commonalities, but that's as far as it goes. S5.

Berkeley is a kind of nominalist about objects
We have no positive idea of man, or triangle, or matter, as all are abstractions.
Matter as unknown something: S77
S81: trifling with words
Irrelevance of a new sense: S78
The real problem here is the contradiction: S13

Berkeley has several more constructive arguments for idealism, in addition to his criticisms from the doctrine of abstract ideas.

Argument for idealism from empiricism

1) Objects are sensible things
2) Sensible things have sensible qualities
3) The sensible qualities are the secondary qualities
4) Those secondary qualities are strictly mental properties
:. Objects are strictly mental, I.e. there is no physical world

Regarding premises 1 and 2: read S3
This is clear for certain properties, like color.

Just extend the point to all qualities.
We perceive only the perceptions, not what's behind them.

2 arguments to show that primary qualities (extension, motion, shape) are mental:

1) Lockean style, S14-S15
Lockean-style argument:
If two or more people can have different experiences of a property, or if one person in two or more different states (at different times) has different experiences, then the experienced property must be just mental, and not external.
size/ extension can be seen to be a secondary property: Consider how an extremely small creature perceives size differently from an extremely large creature.
shape: Consider the different shape that objects have under a microscope.
motion: Consider the speed of the succession of ideas in our minds; also, consider relative time frames.

2) Reduction of primary to secondary: S10

1. The secondary properties are just mental.

2. We can only perceive primary qualities with their attendant secondary qualities.

3. So, wherever the secondary qualities are, that's where the primary qualities are.

So, the primary qualities are just mental, as well.

Notice that for Berkeley, there is no primary/secondary distinction: S9

Consider: objects are what we see, hear, smell, touch, and taste;
Esse is percipi (or percipere): being is perceiving, or being perceived (S3)
Note that for Locke, our ideas were like objects (for primary qualities).

Berkeley says that there's nothing like an idea except another idea.
Beyond that is illegitimate inference.

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