December 9

Lecture Notes: December 9

References herein to Plato's work refer to the traditional, marginal page numbers.

Plato

Euthyphro

This dialogue is a search for the form of piety.
But we can also read this dialogue with an ear for an analogous search, for the good.
Or for justice, generally.

Euthyphro about to prosecute his father for murder of a slave.
Socrates is aghast that someone would do such a thing (not the murder, but the prosecution).
He wants to know how Euthyphro could be sure enough of the nature of piety that he would prosecute his own father.
Euthyphro must really know what piety is.

Euthyphro says he does in fact know what piety is, and provides several definitions, each shown insufficient by Socrates.

Euthyphro's first attempt is at 5d-e: Piety is prosecuting wrongdoers.
But this is not a definition.

Rather, it's an example of one pious action.
We want a definition to work like a tool, a method for determining whether an action is pious.

Euthyphro's next definition is at 7a: The pious is what is dear to the gods.
This works as a tool, for then we can ask the gods!
Of course, we then have to know what the gods think, but this becomes a separate problem.

Still, there's a problem with this definition: the gods sometimes disagree.
Euthyphro responds by saying that the acts on which the gods disagree are neither pious nor impious..
His act is pleasing to all the gods, so holy.

This leads to Euthyphro's third definition: The pious is what is dear to all the gods.

The impious is what is hated by all the gods.

But, this leads to an interesting problem: which is the cause and which is the effect?
That is: 10a
This question is one of the most famous (and difficult) in all of philosophy
Consider the analogous question about the good, placed in a monotheistic context.
Let's say that the good is what is pleasing to God.

Is the good good because it is pleasing to God, or is it pleasing to God because it's good?

Similarly, and specifically, Is murder wrong because God hates it, or does God hate murder because it is wrong?

The first option is called voluntarism, or Divine Command Theory.
Ethics, then, becomes a part of religion, and we should look to God for morality.
But this option entails that God could change his mind, making murder, for example, morally acceptable.

That's uncomfortable.

Isn't there a reason God chooses certain acts as good and others as bad?

If so, then voluntarism is wrong, and the other option is right.

The second option is called natural law theory.
This entails a kind of limit on God's power: God can't make murder morally acceptable.
This may be seen as a limit on God's omnipotence.
This also means that there's ethical work to be done outside of religion.

This is Socrates' position (10d) about piety.
The gods are constrained by the forms, just as we are.
Perhaps this is why Socrates charged with impiety.

Socrates argues that the pious has the property of being loved by the gods because it is pious.
But that which is loved by the gods has the property of being loved by the gods just by definition. (10e-11b)
So Euthyphro's third attempt at defining the pious also fails.

We still need a reason for something to be pious.

Socrates and Euthyphro agree that piety is some part of justice.
As shame is some part of fear.
They try 'care of the gods': but this definition fails since we can't improve the gods.
They try 'service to the gods': but this becomes gifts, which becomes what is held dear to the gods.
They've run in circles.
And Euthyphro runs away.

This is the end of the course.

Good luck with your final preparation.

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