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Class Responses and Instructor Comments

>From MILDRED FERENTINO:

"When one particular species of event has always in all instances been conjoined with another we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other and of employing that reasoning, which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object cause the other effect. We suppose that there is some connexion between them; some power in the one by which it infallibly produces the other and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity. It appears then that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances, which occur of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions." pg 50

>rm says: This is accurate, but begs explanation.

Hume Reading Guide 36. Why do we call some objects causes and others effects? What gives us the feeling that there is a connection between the two?		Back to Hume Reading Guide Back to Philosophy 101 Home Next Question
Enter your response to the above question, or to a previous response, in the form below, or use this email link. I will post your response on the right, and comment if I think I can be helpful. When emailing, instead of using the form, please indicate the question number. When using the form below, if you neglect to enter your name or email, I won't know who you are.	Class Responses and Instructor Comments >From MILDRED FERENTINO: "When one particular species of event has always in all instances been conjoined with another we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other and of employing that reasoning, which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object cause the other effect. We suppose that there is some connexion between them; some power in the one by which it infallibly produces the other and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity. It appears then that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances, which occur of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions." pg 50 >rm says: This is accurate, but begs explanation.
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