Descartes Reading Guide

 

22. What potential problem does Descartes find in supposing God not to be a deceiver?

 

Back to Descartes Reading Guide

 

Back to Philosophy 101 Home

 

Next Question

Enter your response to the above question, or to a previous response, in the form below, or use this email link. I will post your response on the right, and comment if I think I can be helpful. When emailing, instead of using the form, please indicate the question number. When using the form below, if you neglect to enter your name or email, I won't know who you are.

Class Responses and Instructor Comments

 

>From Wai Yan Ng:

If God is not the deceiver then who is? Is that the problem? Do you mean why evil exist? I am confused.

 

>rm says: We haven't gotten here, yet (October 2) but you are on the right track. Only, evil is more directly a problem with God's omnibenevolence, while Descartes here deals with a different characteristic.

 

>From dorota:

Descartes clear idea about the mind-as a thinking thing that can doubt creates an idea of a being that is independent and complete--GOD. God is superior than human mind depend upon HIM.Since only GOD is able to comprehand everything than human mind can know nothing evident or certain.(does my reasoning make sense?)Therefore, Descartes think about himself as incomplete and dependent.

 

>rm says: The second to last sentence, I don't think follows. The last sentence is a fair enough representation of one of Descartes' views.. But why would this be a problem? There's something else.

>From NAKISHA:

THE PROBLEM THAT ARISES IS, IF GOD IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR MISTAKES, THEN HE IS NO LONGER PERFECT AND WE CAN'T DOUBT THAT HE IS DECIEVING US.

 

>rm says: This is a nice way to put it, a bit differently than I put the point in class.

 

>From anna grier:

The potential problem is, if God is a deciever that makes him imperfect and leaves room for doubt that Descartes is being decieved.

 

> rm says: Or doubt that he can err, even.

 

Write your comments here:

Your Name:

Your email: