Descartes Reading Guide
15. Why can't ideas, properly speaking, be false?
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Class Responses and Instructor Comments
>From dorota: Ideas
concerned alone in their owne sense and not compared to anything else,
like one can think about unicorn, this simple idea can not be false.
>rm
says: What does it mean to be "compared to" something else?
I agree that the unicorn is a key example here. Why? >From anna grier: Ideas that are within Descartes come from a surpremely perfect being and the idea of God within must have God himself as the first cause, and with God being a perfect being, false ideas would be a defect which is incompatible with God. Being refered to "something else" could be refering to the imagination.
>rm says: But just as with Q22, this makes it look like we can never make mistakes, which is clearly untrue. I think, in fact, that your last sentence is the opposite of what Descartes intends. If something is in the imagination (alone) then it doesn't refer to anything else. It is only by judging (e.g. that something in our imagination resembles something external to us) that we can err.
>From W Y Ng: If ideas are false, then wouldn't everything come into doubt such as the emotions. Does this question refer to the content of mind?
>rm
says: Yes, if ideas could be false, then so could emotions and volitions.
So, why can't all of these be false? This is exactly about the content
of the mind. What is it not about? Ideas
are related to volitions,emotions and these could be false,but if ideas
are considered alone and in their own right without being referred to
>rm
says: Descartes also says that volitions and emotions can not be false,
also. If I want something, it's true that I want it even if it doesn't
exist or I can't have it. The something else (to which an idea may be
compared) is not, in the case of false judging, only another idea; in
fact the real problem comes when comparing our ideas to something other
than ideas!
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