BQ25

Class Responses and Instructor Comments

>From w y ng:

partially, because berkeley only believes in the secondary qualities existing.

> rm says: Another way to put this is that all properties turn out to be sensory.

>From KAI YU and WAI YAN:

an idea is an but an another idea, since everything is perceived from secondary qualities and there is connection between primary and secondary qualities then we cannot say there are any primary qualities therefore nothing is material.

rm says: The first clause in this sentence doesn't make sense. The rest seems like a start at answering a different question, perhaps 26.

Berkeley Reading Guide 25. Why can't our ideas of objects resemble material substance? How does this show the primary/ secondary distinction to be unhelpful?		Back to Berkeley Reading Guide Back to Philosophy 101 Home Next Question
Enter your response to the above question, or to a previous response, in the form below, or use this email link. I will post your response on the right, and comment if I think I can be helpful. When emailing, instead of using the form, please indicate the question number. When using the form below, if you neglect to enter your name or email, I won't know who you are.	Class Responses and Instructor Comments >From w y ng: partially, because berkeley only believes in the secondary qualities existing. > rm says: Another way to put this is that all properties turn out to be sensory. >From KAI YU and WAI YAN: an idea is an but an another idea, since everything is perceived from secondary qualities and there is connection between primary and secondary qualities then we cannot say there are any primary qualities therefore nothing is material. rm says: The first clause in this sentence doesn't make sense. The rest seems like a start at answering a different question, perhaps 26.
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