Midterm Questions

Hamilton College, Fall 2008

Sample Questions for the Midterm

Questions for Weiskrantz/Mack and Rock

1. How might the phenomena of blindsight and inattention blindness be used to support an argument for the reality of qualia?

2. How might such phenomena be used to support a physicalist theory of consciousness?

Questions for Mandik

1. What is the (philosophical) importance of neuroscience for each of the following theories of the mind?
a) dualism
b) behaviorism
c) indentity theory
d) functionalism
e) eliminative materialism

2. Describe the differences among autonomy, reductionism, and eliminativism as relations between psychological states posited by cognitive science and neurophysiological processes studied in neuroscience.

3. How can the neurophilosopher avoid accusations that s/he is just throwing science at the problem?

Questions for Churchland's discussion of neuroscience

1. How do inferences about neurological functions depend largely on evidence from damaged brains?

2. Why might the philosopher of neuroscience be accused of chauvinism? How might Chalmers’ double aspect theory vindicate neuroscience research in philosophy?

3. How do computers help us explore the functional properties of brains? Are there important differences between human learning and training-up a neural network?

Questions for Chalmers

1. Distinguish the easy problems of consciousness from the hard problem.

2. How are Crick and Koch’s neurobiological theory of consciousness and Baar’s global workspace theory of consciousness aimed at the easy, rather than the hard, problem of consciousness?

3. Contrast reductive and non-reductive theories of consciousness. How is Chalmers’ theory of consciousness non-reductive?

4. Describe Chalmers’ principle of structural coherence. How does it address the hard problem?

5. How is the principle of organizational invariance a functionalist principle? How does the possibility of dancing qualia support the principle?

6. What is the double aspect theory of information? How does it explain the principle of structural coherence?

Questions for Eliminative Materialism

1. Why can’t we determine if the Antipodeans have minds? Consider the questions of whether mental states are incorrigible or inferential.

2. Are brain states accidental properties of mental states, or essential properties of them? Contrast with the case of heat.

3. What is the difference between an incorrigible apprehension of private qualia, and a corrigible apprehension of the world?

4. Is folk psychology a theory? Is it a good theory?

5. Explain the relation between identity theory and eliminative materialism.

Questions for Dennett

1. Outline Dennett’s argument against the reality of qualia.

2. How does Dennett respond to the purported ineffability of qualia?

3. How does Dennett argue against the intrinsicality of qualia?

4. How does Dennett interpret the privacy of qualia? Relate his argument, especially, to his arguments about memory.

5. What does our ability to refine our tastes and other sense perceptions show about qualia?

Questions for Jackson

1. What is epiphenomenalism? How does Jackson’s version of epiphenomenalism differ from traditional versions?

2. What is a zombie? Are zombies possible? What would their possibility show?

3. Explain the knowledge argument, in detail. What does it conclude?

4. How do the modal and knowledge arguments for epiphenomenalism differ? Is one more defensible than the other?

5. Why might the epiphenomenalist have a problem about the causal efficacy of qualia? How does Jackson defend the causal impotence of qualia?

6. How does Jackson criticize Nagel’s position? Who is right?

Questions for Nagel

1. What is the subjective character of experience? How is it a problem for physicalism?

2. Are there facts about the subjective character of experience? Explain both the negative and positive responses.

3. How are scientific reductions mystical?

4. Is the ineffability of the first-person perspective an epistemological problem? Explain.

Problems for Functionalism

1. Distinguish between machine functionalism and Ramsey-sentence functionalism. Be as specific as possible.

2. What is the Absent Qualia Argument against functionalism? Is it successful? What is the best response a functionalist can make to it?

3. Distinguish Functionalism and Psychofunctionalism. Is either theory more plausible?

4. How might functionalism be too chauvinist?

5. Is it equally plausible that brain-headed systems and homunculus-headed systems have qualia? Explain.

Functionalism and Multiple Realizability

1. What is multiple realizability? Why is it a problem for the identity theory (type physicalism)?

2. According to functionalism, what are mental states?

3. What is a relational construal of mental states? How does it relate to the problems of multiple realizability? How does functionalism respect the, “Ontological autonomy of mental particulars” (Fodor).

4. How is functionalism similar to behaviorism? How is it similar to identity theory?

Identity Theory

1. What is Place’s distinction between the ‘is’ of definition and the ‘is’ of composition? Why is it important for him to make this distinction?

2. “Consciousness and brain processes must be independent entities because the expressions used to refer to them are logically independent...” (Place, 46). Explain. Relate to Descartes’s argument for dualism and to Place’s argument for identity theory.

3. How does the phenomenological fallacy support dualism against the identity theory?

4. How does the identity theorist solve the behaviorist’s problem of mental causation?

5. What advantages does identity theory have over dualism? What advantages does identity theory have over behaviorism?

6. Contrast occurrent mental states with intentional states.

7. How and why are the identities of sensations with brain states supposed to be contingent?

Behaviorism:

1. Why do the behaviorists reject dualism?

2. What is positivism? How does it relate to behaviorism?

3. Why do behaviorists reject internal explanations?

4. How are unconscious mental states a problem for the dualist? How does the behaviorist accommodate them?

5. Are inner states the causes of behavior, or identical to them?

6. Why does Skinner reject neurological data as irrelevant to psychology? (TCMS video)

Dualism:

1. What is Descartes’s argument for the mind/body distinction? Describe one significant difficulty with the argument.

2. Distinguish substance dualism from conceptual dualism.

3. What, for Descartes, is the distinguishing mark of the mental? How does this characteristic relate to the argument for the mind/body distinction?